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Abstract
In philosophy of mind, zombies are imaginary creatures that are exact physical duplicates of conscious subjects for whom 
there is no first-personal experience. Zombies are meant to show that physicalism—the theory that the universe is made up 
entirely out of physical components—is false. In this paper, I apply the zombie thought experiment to the realm of moral-
ity to assess whether moral agency is something independent from sentience. Algorithms, I argue, are a kind of functional 
moral zombie, such that thinking about the latter can help us better understand and regulate the former. I contend that the 
main reason why algorithms can be neither autonomous nor accountable is that they lack sentience. Moral zombies and 
algorithms are incoherent as moral agents because they lack the necessary moral understanding to be morally responsible. To 
understand what it means to inflict pain on someone, it is necessary to have experiential knowledge of pain. At most, for an 
algorithm that feels nothing, ‘values’ will be items on a list, possibly prioritised in a certain way according to a number that 
represents weightiness. But entities that do not feel cannot value, and beings that do not value cannot act for moral reasons.
Keywords Algorithms · Moral agency · Moral responsibility · Autonomous systems · Zombies · Accountability · 
Autonomy · Sentience · Consciousness · Reasons-responsiveness
1 Introduction
In philosophy of mind, zombies are imaginary creatures 
designed to illustrate issues related to physicalism and con-
sciousness. Zombies are exact physical duplicates of con-
scious subjects for whom there is no first-personal experi-
ence. In addition to being physically just like us, molecule 
for molecule, they are also our functional duplicates. Zom-
bies behave indistinguishably from human beings—they 
complain about the weather, they cry when they watch sad 
movies, and they have been known to discuss philosophy 
conundrums for hours at a time. Unlike human beings, they 
lack conscious experience. It is nothing there is like to be a 
zombie—they do not suffer from cold when it is cold, they 
do not feel sadness when they cry, and philosophical puzzles 
do not worry or excite them.
Zombies are meant to show that physicalism—the theory 
that the universe is made up entirely out of physical com-
ponents—is false. If there could be creatures that act like us 
without conscious experience, then consciousness must be 
something above and beyond our physical bodies.
The zombie thought experiment is yet to be applied to the 
realm of morality, but there is an analogous question to be 
explored regarding sentience and moral agency. Applying 
the zombie thought experiment to moral agency can help us 
assess whether moral agency is something independent of 
conscious experience, or sentience. By sentience I mean the 
capacity, at a minimum, to have a subjective experience of 
pleasure and pain. I wish to remain agnostic as to whether 
subjective experience is synonymous with sentience. For 
the purposes of this paper, I will focus on sentience because 
it is conceivable that there could be conscious experience 
without feelings of pain or pleasure, and without emotions, 
and I take these latter experiences to be what matter most for 
moral agency. Delving into these issues, however, is beyond 
the scope of this paper and unnecessary for my purposes.
In what follows, I first present the case for algorithms 
being akin to moral zombies, and for the significance of 
the moral zombie thought experiment. I then suggest that 
much of the literature on algorithms assumes a degree of 
moral agency in algorithms. In turn, most accounts of moral 
agency defend either some version of autonomy or some ver-
sion of moral responsibility as constitutive of moral agency, 
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or both. I go on to analyse whether algorithms and moral 
zombies are autonomous in the relevant sense for moral 
agency, and argue that they are not. I then argue that moral 
responsibility is more relevant to assessing moral agency 
than autonomy, but neither algorithms nor moral zombies 
are morally responsible either. I contend that the main reason 
why algorithms can be neither autonomous nor accountable 
is that they lack sentience. Moral zombies are incoherent as 
moral agents because they lack the necessary moral under-
standing to be morally responsible. To understand what it 
means to inflict pain on someone, it is necessary to have 
experiential knowledge of pain. I end the paper by respond-
ing to three possible objections.
2  Algorithms as moral zombies
Moral zombies would be creatures who act indistinguishably 
from us as moral agents, but for whom there is nothing it is 
like to be them. Moral zombies would act like us without 
feeling like us. Like human beings, they would be able to do 
good by donating to charity, protecting vulnerable people 
against injustice, and respecting rights. They would also have 
the power to do evil by violating rights and causing unnec-
essary suffering—they could insult, betray, threaten, and 
physically aggress others. Unlike human beings, they would 
not feel pain, pleasure, empathy, intimacy, remorse, guilt, 
shame, or any other moral emotion. A moral zombie would 
not rejoice at saving a life or suffer guilt from taking one.
Moral zombies, as described, seem to be conceivable crea-
tures, which shows that the power to have a moral impact in the 
world is independent from sentience. But we already know that 
from hurricanes and other natural phenomena that can cause 
harm without there being any agency. The relevant question 
for ethics is whether moral zombies are conceivable as moral 
agents. If they are not, then the thought experiment would sug-
gest that where there is moral agency, there is sentience.
Moral zombies may not only be a thought experiment. 
It could be argued that something like moral zombies are 
already among us; they are often called algorithms, robots, 
or AI (I will use these terms more or less interchangeably). 
Automated systems may not look like us (yet), but this detail 
is arguably morally irrelevant (at least for the question of 
moral agency). We can imagine robots looking like human 
beings in the not too distant future. While AI is not yet and 
will likely never be a physical duplicate of human beings, it 
can be considered a functional duplicate in some respects—
which is why machines can replace human beings in increas-
ingly more tasks. Algorithms already resemble us in some 
of the decisions they are making, and the moral impact they 
can have on the world, with people getting hired, sacked, 
rewarded, and even jailed on account of them. They are not 
like us, however, in that there is nothing it is like to be them. 
Thus, thinking about algorithms can help us think through 
the moral zombie thought experiment, and thinking about 
moral zombies can help us better understand algorithms.
The first objection someone might level at my argument is 
that we cannot know for sure that algorithms or machines are 
not sentient. Admittedly, I cannot prove beyond all shadow 
of a doubt that there is nothing it is like to be an algorithm. 
But, for that matter, I cannot prove that rocks are not sentient 
either. If panpsychists are right, even rocks may have some 
degree of consciousness or proto-consciousness. There is, 
however, not enough evidence to suggest that algorithms (or 
rocks) have a mind or can feel.
It might be argued that, out of epistemic humility, if algo-
rithms behave as us, we should treat them much like we 
treat human beings (Danaher 2020; Sparrow 2004). At the 
moment, however, algorithms resemble us only in some of 
the tasks and functions they perform in society, but not in a 
more global sense. In that regard, they are not full zombies, 
but merely something like functional moral zombies. Algo-
rithms today can select job candidates or assess the probabil-
ity of someone committing a crime, but they cannot develop 
a passion for French comedies or be moved by kindness.
There may come a time when machines are so similar to 
us that caution may be warranted (Véliz 2016). It is likely 
that they would need to have bodies similar to ours. There 
might not be such a thing as a disembodied mind (Varela 
et al. 1991). And it might be that only beings with biologi-
cal bodies can be sentient. Part of what makes us feel and 
think the way we do is our heart beating faster when we 
are excited, our blood pressure dropping when we experi-
ence sadness, sweat running down our temples when we are 
scared, our skin curling into goose bumps when we are awe-
struck. The burden of proof, then, seems to be on whoever 
wants to argue that algorithms are sentient.
3  Moral agency and algorithms
There is a tendency in the literature to describe automated 
systems in ways that seem to imply some degree of moral 
agency1 (Sharkey 2017). In some cases, implicit references 
1 In the literature on AI and ethics, many authors (e.g.  Gunkel D 
(2012) The Machine Question: Critical Perspectives on AI, Robots, 
and Ethics. MIT Press, Floridi L and Sanders JW (2004) On the 
Morality of Artificial Agents. Minds and Machines 14: 349–379.) dis-
tinguish between moral agency (roughly, the capacity to make moral 
judgments and bear moral obligations towards others) and moral 
patiency (roughly, being the target of the actions of a moral agent, 
and being worthy of moral consideration). This paper is concerned 
with moral agency, not with moral patiency. In other words, the paper 
asks whether algorithms can be held accountable for what they do to 
us. What, if anything, we owe algorithms is beyond the scope of the 
paper. I take it, however, that if someone is a moral agent, then she is 
also a moral patient. The reverse might not be true.
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to moral agency seem to be a mere rhetorical device. In the 
spirit of Daniel Dennett’s intentional stance, sometimes it 
can be useful to describe artefacts as if they had intentions 
and beliefs, even when we think them mindless. Wendell 
Wallach and Colin Allen write, for example, that ‘Driver-
less systems put machines in the position of making split-
second decisions that could have life or death implications’ 
(2009: 14). In the same vein, Robert Sparrow writes that 
what makes weapons systems automated is ‘that they have 
the capacity to choose their own targets’ (2007: 70). Even 
though Sparrow goes on to argue that autonomous weap-
ons systems are not morally responsible, the language of 
moral decision-making seems appropriate only in reference 
to moral agents. Referring to autonomous systems in ways 
that are accurate only when describing moral agents is mor-
ally significant. As Noel Sharkey puts it:
‘[Some terms] act as linguistic Trojan horses that smug-
gle in a rich interconnected web of human concepts that are 
not part of a computer system or how it operates. Once the 
reader has accepted a seemingly innocent Trojan term (…) it 
opens the gate to other meanings associated with the natural 
language use of the term’ (Sharkey 2012: 793).
Perhaps, this tendency to talk of autonomous systems as 
if they were moral agents, or the messy debate on moral 
agency and AI, has led some writers to suggest that we 
should stop asking ourselves if autonomous systems are 
truly moral agents (Behdadi and Munthe 2020).2 But that 
approach seems unsatisfying. The reason we ask ourselves 
if AIs are or can be moral agents is not out of metaphysi-
cal curiosity, but rather because we care about the practi-
cal implications. If AIs are not moral agents, then some-
one needs to take responsibility for what they do. If AIs are 
moral agents, then presumably we should be treating them 
accordingly (suing them when they break the law, sending 
them to jail, and considering them bearers of rights, among 
other practices).
Although most writers only use the language of moral 
agency metaphorically or pragmatically, in some cases, there 
does seem to be an explicit belief that autonomous agents 
can be moral agents. For instance, when writing about self-
driving cars, Mark Coeckelbergh argues that ‘all agency is 
entirely transferred to the [car]’ (2016: 754).
Of course, different authors mean different things when 
referring to moral agency. A dominant way of categoris-
ing moral agency in the AI literature is that of James H. 
Moor (Moor 2009). He proposes four categories of ethical 
agency: (1) ethical impact agents (agents whose actions have 
ethical consequences; most or all autonomous systems count 
as ethical impact agents); (2) implicit ethical agents (those 
that have been designed with ethics in mind, e.g. ATMs); 
(3) explicit ethical agents (agents that can act from ethics, 
and not merely in accordance with ethics; they can identify 
ethical problems and work out solutions for themselves); (4) 
full ethical agents (they can do what explicit ethical agents 
do and, in addition, they have consciousness, intentionality, 
and free will). My claim in this paper is that explicit ethical 
agents and full ethical agents are one and the same category. 
In other words, I claim we will not get an agent that can 
identify ethical problems and respond adequately to them 
without sentience.
Given that my argument pivots on sentience, the most 
interesting perspective (and contrary to mine) is that of 
Luciano Floridi and J.W. Sanders, who not only argue that 
artificial autonomous agents can be considered moral agents, 
but also that they constitute an instance of ‘mind-less moral-
ity’ (2004, 351). In disagreement with Floridi and Sand-
ers, I contend that sentience is necessary for moral agency, 
because conscious experience of the kind that allows for 
feelings like pleasure, pain, and empathy seems necessary 
for moral agency.
An agent is, roughly, an entity that can be the source of 
action. Most accounts of moral agency in philosophy defend 
either some version of autonomy or some version of moral 
responsibility as constitutive of moral agency, or both. The 
relationship between these concepts is fraught with contro-
versy. Some philosophers think that whenever there is one, 
the other follows, while others argue that autonomy and 
moral responsibility are independent from each other. For 
our purposes, it is not essential to establish the exact rela-
tionship between autonomy and moral responsibility. What 
matters is that, under any plausible account of autonomy that 
is relevant to morality, and under any plausible account of 
moral responsibility, neither moral zombies nor algorithms 
can be moral agents, or so I argue.
4  Autonomy and moral agency
Nomy Arpaly argues that there are at least eight ways in 
which ‘autonomy’ has been conceptualised in the literature: 
as personal efficacy, psychological independence, having 
a moral right to self-determination, authenticity, having 
a coherent self-image, being heroic, self-governance, and 
being responsive to reasons. In what follows I go through 
each of these and argue that many of these accounts of 
autonomy do not seem relevant to morality, and the ones 
that do (self-governance and reasons-responsiveness), do not 
apply to moral zombies or algorithms.
2 Dorna Behdadi and Christian Munthe explicitly admit that the rea-
son for their proposal ‘is the high degree of conceptual confusion and 
lack of practical usefulness of the traditional AMA [artificial moral 
agency] debate’ (2020, 214).
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4.1  Personal efficacy
This sense of autonomy describes the quality of not depend-
ing on other people’s help to navigate the world. Floridi and 
Sanders contend that algorithms are autonomous because 
they are ‘able to change state without direct response to 
interaction’—that is, they can act independently of the 
human beings who created them (2004: 357). It does not 
seem that this sense of autonomy is at all relevant to assess 
whether algorithms are moral agents, however. Tornadoes 
can also go about their business without human help, and 
that tells us nothing about whether they are agents—much 
less moral agents.
Autonomy in moral and political philosophy is a much 
richer concept than in the context of computer science and 
engineering. It is the richer kind of autonomy that is relevant 
for moral agency, and not to be confused with the looser 
sense of the adjective ‘autonomous’ used when talking about 
technology. Once we identify an entity as a moral agent, or 
as the subject of moral rights, then it might be relevant to 
know what they can and cannot do independently of other 
agents (e.g. to assess how responsible they can be for their 
actions, or to investigate whether they are owed assistance 
in virtue of their limitations, etc.). But we are not there yet 
when it comes to moral zombies or algorithms, and knowing 
whether they are personally efficacious tells us nothing about 
whether they are moral agents.
4.2  Independence of mind
This version of autonomy is similar to the previous, except 
instead of focusing on the ability to act independently of 
others, it is concerned with the ability to think independent 
of others. If by ‘mind’ we mean something like subjective 
experience, then neither moral zombies nor algorithms have 
a mind. Some philosophers, however, might want to argue 
that subjective experience is not necessary to have a mind. 
In any case, it seems that mental independence does not 
help as a criterion to establish moral agency. Computers 
that play chess, for instance, can ‘think’ independently of 
human beings, and it is quite clear that they are not good 
candidates for moral agency. Once it is evident that someone 
is a moral agent, it may then be morally relevant to establish 
whether they have been unduly influenced in a particular cir-
cumstance (through propaganda, or subliminal messages, or 
direct brain stimulation). But, again, independence of mind 
is not relevant as a test of moral agency.
4.3  Moral right to self‑determination
It is widely accepted that moral agents have a right to self-
determination. As a competent adult, you should be able 
to decide how you live your life—as long as you do not 
violate other people’s rights. Respect for autonomy is one of 
the pillars of bioethics. It is what allows patients to decide 
which treatment, if any, they are to receive. While the right 
to self-determination is a very important one, it assumes 
moral agency on the part of the right bearer. The right to 
self-determination is a tool to protect moral agents, it is not 
a property of agents, and as such it cannot be a criterion for 
moral agency.
4.4  Authenticity
To what extent someone acts in an authentic way—follow-
ing their true convictions, or being true to who they are—as 
opposed to acting impulsively, seems to matter for morality. 
Harry Frankfurt (1988) argued that some cases that could 
be interpreted as cases of weakness of will are actually 
cases of someone being constrained by their own deepest 
values. In response, David Velleman (2002) has argued that 
such a theory is not about autonomy but about authenticity. 
Whether authenticity is part of autonomy is not important 
for our purposes. While authenticity might be important to 
assess character and the moral significance of actions, it does 
not seem like a good test for moral agency. We can imagine 
inauthentic moral agents that are moral agents nonetheless. 
Consider a person who does not trust her deepest convictions 
and instead acts imitating others. Such behaviour makes 
her less admirable as a moral agent, but her inauthentic-
ity, unless it were caused by some cognitive deficiency that 
would question her competence, is no reason to question her 
moral agency.
4.5  Self‑identification
Given that autonomy is often thought of as related to the 
absence of external pressure, the phenomenological experi-
ence of owning one’s desires and acts is often thought to 
be relevant to autonomy as well. The autonomous person, 
on this account, is one who is able to self-identify with her 
desires and has a coherent self-image. Most people have 
done something at some point in their lives that was out of 
character for them, with which they did not self-identify. 
While the degree of self-identification can be relevant to 
judge the moral significance of an action, it does not seem 
relevant to judge whether someone is a moral agent. Suppose 
that, even though you are usually a very calm person, one 
day you lose your temper and scream at your partner. While 
you might not self-identify with that action, that does not 
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strip you of your moral agency. Self-identification, then, is 
again not an appropriate test of moral agency.3
4.6  Heroism
Many accounts of autonomy have an ideal agent in mind. 
For stoics, the ideal agent is one who exercises ataraxia; for 
Aristotle, it is the person who leads a life of contemplation; 
for Nietzsche, it is the free spirit. Having an ideal can help 
us assess how close or far a person or an action is from the 
best it could be, but it cannot be a criterion for moral agency. 
If only the few who reach the ideal were to be considered 
moral agents, most competent adults would fail the test of 
moral agency.
4.7  Self‑governance and reasons‑responsiveness
One of the most popular ways of thinking about autonomy is 
in terms of self-governance. The term ‘autonomy’ is derived 
from the Greek ‘autos’ (self), and ‘nomos’ (law); as such, 
the concept that the term ‘autonomy’ aims to capture seems 
to be, broadly speaking, the property of self-government, 
characterised by the agent’s ability to decide how to act. 
Even within theories of autonomy as self-governance, there 
is a great deal of controversy and variety.
 The idea of autonomy as self-governance can be traced 
back to Immanuel Kant (2019), for whom autonomy means 
that no authority external to ourselves is needed to dictate 
the demands of morality (Schneewind 1992). Being autono-
mous entails imposing on ourselves the demands of moral-
ity: we have the ability to recognise what is the right thing 
to do and to act accordingly.
I discuss autonomy as self-governance and as reasons-
responsiveness together because they seem intimately 
related. More precisely, it seems that self-governance 
requires reasons-responsiveness. Moral agents make deci-
sions and act accordingly at least partly because they are 
responding to reasons. If an entity is not the kind of creature 
who can understand reasons, then she will not govern herself 
in a way that is relevant for morality.
Crucial to autonomy as self-governance is the capacity to 
act in accordance with reason in a way that responds to one’s 
own motives (Christman 2015). To be autonomous, one 
must be able to reflect on (Watson 2013: 4–5), endorse, and 
act on one’s values (Christman 2015). It is because a person 
is able to choose her values for herself and live accordingly 
that we must ask for her consent to interact with her in inva-
sive ways, for example, in the case of a medical procedure. 
We do not need to ask an algorithm its permission to modify 
it or even terminate it because algorithms do not have values 
of their own; they do not care about their own existence. Nor 
can they respond to reasons qua reasons: You cannot per-
suade an algorithm to do something through giving it good 
reasons—you can only programme it one way or another.
A robot could respond to its environment in ways that are 
in accordance with ethics (e.g. if it sees a human being car-
rying something heavy, it offers to carry it for them). That a 
human being is struggling with carrying her groceries and 
that it will be effortless for the robot to carry them for her, 
however, is not a reason for the robot—it is an instruction. 
The robot cannot desire to relieve the strained arms of the 
person because, first, it has no desires, and second, it has no 
idea what it feels like to have your arms hurt from carry-
ing something heavy. Furthermore, the robot cannot reflect 
on the relationship between our acts and having a healthy 
citizenry, or on the benefits of civil friendship. A reason, for 
moral agents, amounts to something that matters to us, that 
we care about because we understand its moral significance.
Algorithms are programmed to do something: win a 
game of chess, distinguish spam from non-spam, identify 
people who might want to buy a product, assess whether 
a candidate will be appropriate for a job, etc. Algorithms, 
however, are incapable of normatively assessing the objec-
tive for which they have been created, and modifying their 
behaviour accordingly.4
Consider the role algorithms play in advancing for-profit 
colleges in the United States. These are expensive, low-qual-
ity colleges that advertise themselves to vulnerable popula-
tions as a way out of their underprivileged status. In fact, in 
the work market, a person is no better off having a diploma 
from a for-profit college than not having attended college at 
all (Darolia et al. 2015). To identify possible clients for a 
for-profit college, algorithms look for people in the poorest 
postal codes who have clicked on ads for payday loans, or 
whose search histories reveal a concern with post-traumatic 
stress (O’Neil 2016: Loc 1052). When such algorithms 
perform their tasks, they are not wondering whether it is 
morally correct to prey on vulnerable people, and they are 
incapable of deciding to quit their jobs and go for a more 
ethical line of work.
A self-driving car is incapable of choosing its destina-
tion on a whim. It cannot wake up one day with the desire 
3 For more on self-identification and autonomy, see Schroeder T and 
Arpaly N (1999) Alienation and Externality. Canadian Journal of 
Philosophy 29(3): 371–388.
4 To be clear, the problem I am pinpointing here is not that algo-
rithms are programmed. A critic might point out that human beings 
are programmed in some ways by genetics and culture. What is of 
concern is that algorithms do not have sentience to help them modify 
their programming. A human being may have been educated to be 
religious, but a feeling of dissatisfaction might lead her to change the 
course of her life. My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing 
me on this point.
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to enjoy the countryside and disobey its owner, who needs 
to get to work. A killer robot cannot become a pacifist after 
considering the negative consequences of its actions. It is 
not that the killer robot has been programmed to believe that 
its killing is morally justified—it does not have the capacity 
to either believe in or question its raison d’être. It cannot 
reflect on what it wants, what is worth pursuing, or how it 
should live its life.5
In a nutshell then, algorithms are neither self-governing, 
because they need external input to set themselves goals, 
nor reasons-responsive, as no reasons could ever ‘con-
vince’ them to change the goal for which they have been 
programmed.
Moral zombies, on the other hand, might appear to be 
both self-governing and reasons-responsive, given that, by 
definition, they would behave indistinguishably from human 
beings. However, it is unclear that moral zombies could be 
said to have motives of their own. If nothing moves them, if 
they cannot feel desire, fear, hope, or empathy, it could be 
argued that they cannot own their goals like moral agents 
do. In that sense, whatever goal they pursue is not theirs, in 
that they do not have the capacity to endorse it, to feel they 
approve of it. Similarly, it is questionable that moral zombies 
are reasons-responsive, at least in some moral cases. Sup-
pose a human being asks a moral zombie to stop stepping on 
her foot because it is painful to her. If the moral zombie has 
never felt pain, it is unclear that we should say that when it 
stops stepping on the person’s foot, it is responding to the 
reasons given by her.
According to our analysis thus far, only self-governance 
and reasons-responsiveness are relevant to the kind of auton-
omy that in turn is suggestive of moral agency, and it seems 
like neither moral zombies nor algorithms are autonomous 
is those senses. Focusing on autonomy, however, although 
intuitive, may not the best way of getting at whether moral 
zombies or algorithms are moral agents. First, there are so 
many senses of autonomy, some of which are hard to sepa-
rate from each other, that a focus on autonomy in moral 
discussions risks inviting misunderstanding, rather than 
contributing clarity (Arpaly 2002, 126). Second, working 
out who is a moral agent is not primarily a matter of intel-
lectual curiosity—it is a practically-oriented task. What we 
ought to look for then, if we want to know whether there can 
be moral agency without sentience, is a satisfactory account 
of moral agency.
There are two main practical reasons why we might care 
about ascertaining moral agency. The first reason is to pro-
tect subjects of moral rights who might not be able to protect 
themselves. In medical ethics, for instance, we want to make 
sure that research subjects and patients are in a position to 
make competent and well-informed decisions that they are 
unlikely to regret in the future. In that context, establishing 
autonomy is a priority because autonomy is a sign that such 
people can decide for themselves what is best for them, and 
therefore should be allowed to make such decisions. That 
worry does not apply to either moral zombies or algorithms. 
Given that moral zombies and algorithms do not have the 
capacity to suffer, we do not worry about them regretting 
their decisions, or unwittingly bringing harm to themselves.
What is concerning about algorithms is that they can act 
on the world and have enormous impact, for better or worse, 
which leads us to the second reason why ascertaining moral 
agency is important. When things go wrong, we want to 
make sure that we know who to look to when wanting to 
secure accountability. Given that establishing who is a moral 
agent is a practical challenge, I will stay clear of metaphysi-
cal issues (for example, regarding free will). I take it that 
our moral and political practices regarding moral agency 
are grounded enough that metaphysical questions will not be 
relevant for practical purposes. Establishing moral respon-
sibility, then, is important in contexts in which we want to 
make sure the appropriate parties are held accountable for 
possible wrongdoings.
In other words, philosophical discussions of moral agency 
are a coin with two sides: one side has the decision maker 
as the object of concern (autonomy) and the other side is 
concerned with accountability (moral responsibility). In the 
context of both moral zombies and algorithms, what matters 
is accountability.
5  Moral responsibility and moral agency
Most accounts of autonomy are not relevant to establish 
moral responsibility. Agents can be morally responsible 
even if they do not have much independence of mind or 
body, or when their moral right to self-determination has 
been violated (e.g. slaves can be morally responsible agents), 
even if they are not moral heroes, even if they do not always 
identify with their action, and even if they are inauthentic. In 
contrast, both self-governance and reasons-responsiveness 
seem to be important for moral agency, but not necessarily 
5 The main argument of this paper is that sentience is needed for 
agency. Someone might think, however, that the main argument has 
more to do with reasons-responsiveness (or the possibility of acting 
otherwise, in response to reasons). What I suggest is that sentience 
is a necessary ingredient for an agent to be motivated by reasons 
(qua reasons). Take the example of someone who is convinced by 
philosophical arguments to donate to charity in order to relieve pov-
erty. To be motivated by such reasons as reasons, one has to have a 
visceral sense of what it might feel like to live in extreme poverty, 
of the badness of extreme suffering. Even if one has never had the 
actual experience of extreme poverty, one can extrapolate from one’s 
own experiences of suffering to imagine what it must be like. To put 
it another way, any human being knows enough about suffering to 
dread becoming the victim of extreme poverty in a way that non-sen-
tient beings do not.
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because they are important for autonomy—unless we take 
autonomy and moral agency to be synonymous, which would 
go against the term usage of most philosophers. Rather, self-
governance and reasons-responsiveness are important for 
moral agency insofar they are capacities that ground moral 
responsibility.
Gary Watson (2013) convincingly argues that moral 
agents are beings who are autonomous (in the sense of self-
governing), and accountable (morally responsible in a way 
that they are answerable to others). Happily, there is much 
more consensus about what moral responsibility is than 
about autonomy.
Michael McKenna understands morally responsible 
agency as ‘accountability for guiding conduct in accord 
with the demands of morality’ (2013: 206). Accountability 
is intimately related to notions of moral blameworthiness 
and praiseworthiness. According to Arpaly, ‘any agent who 
is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy for her action is, 
by definition, at least somewhat morally responsible for that 
action’ (2002, 129).
Just as algorithms are not autonomous, they are not 
accountable. As accountable beings, ‘we are answerable to 
others for how we lead our lives’ (Watson 2013: 1). That 
is, we can recognise others’ interests and moral claims, and 
when we do not respect them, we are liable to be the subjects 
of blame or even punishment. An algorithm, in contrast, 
does not think about the suffering it might be causing by 
encouraging vulnerable people to take out heavy loans to pay 
for a degree at a for-profit college that is worth little or noth-
ing. When wronged by an algorithm, it would not occur to 
us to punish it or ask it for compensation. Rather, we would 
seek redress from the people who designed, implemented, 
and were supposed to supervise the algorithm.
Floridi and Sanders argue that we should not confuse 
accountability with responsibility. According to them, ‘[a]n 
agent is morally accountable for x if the agent is the source 
of x,’ where x is an action causing moral good or evil. To 
also be morally responsible, they argue, ‘the agent needs to 
show the right intentional states’ (Floridi and Sanders 2004: 
371). They believe that entwining the concepts of account-
ability and responsibility amounts to ‘confusing the identi-
fication of x as a moral agent with the evaluation of x as a 
morally responsible agent’ (367). Morality is intrinsically 
about normative evaluation, however. If a moral agent can 
be identified as such, then it must also be the case that we 
can evaluate her as responsible for her actions.
Moral responsibility is intrinsically tied into moral 
responsiveness. Arply argues that ‘For an agent to be mor-
ally praiseworthy for doing the right thing is for her to have 
done the right thing for the relevant moral reasons—that is, 
the reasons for which she acts are identical to the reasons for 
which the action is right’ (Arpaly 2002: 72). When a morally 
valuable consequence comes about as a result of a lucky 
accident (i.e. the sun shining), no one is praiseworthy for it.
To identify a moral agent as the source of action is tanta-
mount to her being the appropriate target of praise or blame. 
It makes no sense to identify someone as a moral agent with-
out evaluating her a responsible moral agent. To be a moral 
agent just means that one is responsible for one’s moral 
actions. When moral agents hurt others, we can blame them 
for their bad intentions or their neglect. In contrast, we do 
not feel moral outrage against algorithms because they could 
not have acted otherwise, given their design and input, and 
they do not have intentions—they do not feel ill will or con-
tempt. ‘If good will—the motive(s) from which praiseworthy 
actions stem—is responsiveness to moral reasons, deficiency 
in good will is insufficient responsiveness to moral reasons, 
obliviousness or indifference to morally relevant factors, and 
ill will is responsiveness to sinister reasons—reasons for 
which it is never moral to act, reasons that, in their essence, 
conflict with morality’ (Arpaly 2002: 79). Unlike people, 
moral zombies and algorithms cannot act from good or ill 
will—they are not sentient.
6  Sentience and moral agency
I contend that the main reason why algorithms can be nei-
ther autonomous nor accountable is that they lack sentience. 
To have a conception of the good that we want to pursue 
(autonomy), we need to have a feel for what leads to pleas-
ure, meaningfulness, and satisfaction. To guide our actions 
by the recognition of others’ moral claims in a way that can 
count as moral actions (accountability), we must have a 
sense of others’ capacity to suffer, of what it feels like to 
be harmed, of what we can do to others’ minds and bodies 
through our actions.
We do not need to experience every kind of pain to be 
able to empathise with others’ pain. Someone who has 
never experienced childbirth can empathise with and desire 
to alleviate the pain of a woman suffering childbirth pain.6 
Of course, the closer your experience is to someone else’s, 
the less of an empathy gap there is likely to be. It is not for 
nothing that people who are undergoing difficulties can feel 
special comfort from others who have gone through some-
thing similar. But is enough to have a sense of what pleasure 
and pain are like to act like competent moral agents.
Sentience serves as the foundation for an internal moral 
lab that guides us in action. When we think about doing 
something, we imagine the possible consequences we might 
cause, and consider the kind of pleasure or pain we might 
create, which motivates us to act one way or another. When 
we realise we might cause someone great bodily damage, we 
6 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the example.
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might flinch as we remember what it feels like to feel physi-
cal pain, our stomachs contracting at the thought. When 
we imagine making someone we love happy, we smile and 
delight at the prospect partly because we know how pleasant 
it feels to be happy.
Moral zombies would not act out of the desire to hurt or 
benefit. What we think of as values will never be values for 
an AI as long as it cannot feel the warmth of the sun or the 
sharpness of a knife blade, the comfort of friendship and the 
unpleasantness of enmity. At most, for an AI that feels noth-
ing, ‘values’ will be items on a list, possibly prioritised in a 
certain way according to a number that represents weighti-
ness. But entities that do not feel cannot value, and beings 
that do not value cannot act for moral reasons. Moral zom-
bies, therefore, are incoherent. Zombies might act in ways 
that harm and benefit human beings, but they could never be 
moral agents or morally responsible.
My take on moral agency is a Humean one. According 
to Hume, beliefs on their own are not enough to morally 
motivate us into action. We need sentiments, passions, to 
be motivated to act morally (T 2.3.3.4/415, T 3.1.1). If 
algorithms do not have access to subjective experiences 
that are attached to value, then they will lack moral motiva-
tion because they will be incapable of appreciating moral 
reasons.
Many accounts of moral agency and responsibility seem 
to implicitly support the view that sentience is a require-
ment for moral agency and responsibility. For example, 
Harry Frankfurt argues that a free agent is ‘prepared to 
endorse or repudiate the motives from which he acts … to 
guide his conduct in accordance with what he really cares 
about’ (1999: 113). Similarly, David Shoemaker notes that 
‘the emotions we have make us the agents we are’; ‘without 
the ability to feel, one would (by definition) be without the 
capacity to care, leaving one’s decision-making landscape 
flat and without salience. With no emotional investment 
in what one might do, all options are on an equal footing’ 
(Shoemaker 2003: 94, 114). According to Arpy, for an agent 
to be morally responsible, she must care about morally rel-
evant considerations, and morally relevant features of situ-
ations must be able to motive the agent into action: ‘One 
cannot blame or praise a creature who cannot be expected to 
perceive the morally relevant features of situations any more 
than an elephant can be expected to perceive legal factors 
[or] aesthetic factors’ (2002, 131).
One reason why sentience has not gained more promi-
nence in the literature on moral responsibility might be that, 
up until now, barring natural causes like old age and the 
weather, only other human beings could be the cause of phe-
nomena like harm and injustice. It was not as important 
to focus on sentience because it was a given. Only human 
beings made decisions about our lives that could negatively 
affect us, and human beings are evidently both sentient and 
moral agents. Moral zombies were just a theoretical possi-
bility. Now that algorithms make up a significant source of 
society’s decisions, we have more of a reason to think about 
the role of sentience in moral agency and responsibility.
7  Responding to objections
7.1  The functional equivalence objection
A functionalist about morality would argue that there is 
nothing more to being a moral agent than acting like one. 
Such a critic might argue that all we need for algorithms to 
be moral agents is to have them behave as such, to be func-
tionally equivalent to us. If they seem to respond appropri-
ately to moral reasons, make decisions that minimise harm, 
and are able to modify their behaviour in response to criti-
cism and punishment, then they are moral agents.
In the literature on intelligence, the critic goes on, the 
worry that there could not be intelligence without subjective 
experience has lost its force with the passage of time. John 
Searle (1980) designed his Chinese Room thought experi-
ment to argue that, while computers may be programmed in 
a way that mimics understanding, computational rules do 
not produce real understanding. Although Searle’s thought 
experiment first inspired an explosion of literature around it, 
interest has tapered. We seem to have stopped caring about 
whether digital assistants and computers really understand—
it is enough for us that they do as we tell them. We seem to 
be more and more comfortable talking about intelligence 
without sentience. Why is functional equivalence not enough 
for moral agency?
My first concern with this objection pertains to non-ideal 
theory: we might never succeed in designing algorithms that 
are full functional equivalents to human moral agents. The 
moral zombie thought experiment might always remain a 
thought experiment. Even if algorithms can replace human 
beings in decision-making tasks, it is doubtful that they will 
ever be able to replicate human moral judgment. My take 
on sentience supports the view that morality is not codifi-
able. According to the codifiability thesis, ethics could be 
summed up in a set of moral rules that could be applied by 
anyone, independent of their moral competency. It’s unusual, 
however, to think that someone can be moral as long as they 
follow a rule, even if they lack understanding or wisdom. 
Morality seems more of a know how than a know that.
Algorithms mimicking moral agency will respond to a 
set of instructions, and sets of instructions can, at best, be 
proxies for moral reasons. The worry is that proxies might 
not be good enough. A computer scientist could programme 
an algorithm to behave in such a way as to not make people 
frown or cry (a proxy for not making people suffer), thereby 
roughly behaving in a morally acceptable way. Except, 
AI & SOCIETY 
1 3
sometimes, making another cry is precisely the moral thing 
to do, as when we vaccinate children.
One could of course imagine inserting exceptions into 
the algorithm—e.g., do not make people cry unless they 
are children and need to be vaccinated—but the algorithm 
will still be pursuing proxies and not morality itself. While 
it might get it right sometimes or even most of the times, 
other times, when it has not encountered a similar situation 
before or has not added the relevant exceptions to its rules, 
morality will be beyond its reach.
My second and more important worry is that if we wrongly 
attribute moral agency to algorithms, the people who are 
responsible for the harm that algorithms cause will be let off 
the hook, thus incentivising recklessness in the design and 
implementation of algorithms.7 We gain nothing by attribut-
ing functional moral agency to algorithms. It does not help 
us understand algorithms better, and it does not lead to bet-
ter accountability. Punishing robots would be mere staging. 
Enacting punishment for a robot (e.g. locking it in a cell for a 
while) might put up an interesting show, but would not be an 
actual punishment, as it is impossible to punish an entity that 
feels nothing and values nothing. The lack of freedom can 
only be a punishment to a being who values freedom.
Contrarily, we have much to lose by attributing moral 
agency to algorithms. If algorithms become the (empty) tar-
gets of our praise and blame, the people who have designed, 
programmed, commissioned, implemented, and audited 
them will not be seen for the responsible moral agents they 
are.
In the case of intelligence, we do not care whether an 
algorithm ‘reading’ Shakespeare is able to awe at the beauty 
of his language. It is enough that it can tell us how many 
times Shakespeare uses a particular word, or whatever else 
we might want it to do. What happens ‘inside’ the AI is 
irrelevant to whether it can deliver the results we expect. 
But morality is a very different sphere of action. Part of 
why we care so much about it is that there is much at stake. 
When people are wronged or harmed—and people are being 
wronged and harmed by algorithms—we want to know who 
is responsible and whether it was intentional; we want to 
hold that person accountable so that justice is met, and simi-
lar wrongs and harms are avoided in the future. Whether we 
should say of an algorithm that it is ‘intelligent’ or it ‘under-
stands’ is a conceptual point of interest to philosophers only. 
Whether an algorithm is a moral agent has practical implica-
tions for the whole of society.
As algorithms are put in charge of more tasks in both the 
public and private sectors, it will be tempting for people to 
push the blame on automated systems when things go wrong 
(Danaher 2016). We have good reason not to let people get 
away without acknowledging their fair share of responsibil-
ity. Algorithms are tools, and human beings are responsible 
for the tools they create and manage.
7.2  The drives objection
Some AI scientists may think that sophisticated algorithms 
will possess something like drives, which could be equated 
with motivation, and from there, there is only a small step 
to moral motivation. Steve Omohundro (2008) argues that, 
to achieve their goals as effectively as possible, AIs will 
develop certain ‘basic drives’—they will be ‘highly moti-
vated’ to do things like self-improve, protect themselves, 
and acquire resources.
The term ‘drive’ is as rhetorically compelling as it is mis-
leading. It makes it sound as if the instrumental goals that 
can be programmed into an AI can influence the system in 
the same way as physical and psychological drives influ-
ence human beings—through phenomenological pulls that 
motivate us to action (Bostrom 2012: 76).
To describe algorithms as ‘driven’ to fulfil their tasks 
is just a manner of speaking, a way of saying that they are 
impelled to do what they were designed to do, and that in 
that process they might find new and more efficient ways of 
accomplishing their undertakings. It does not mean algo-
rithms could act differently out of a deeper reflection about 
the meaning of life, or that they want to perform those tasks 
because they find them worthwhile, or think it is right that 
they do them—all of which would be symptoms of moral 
agency. An agent can only change its course of action as a 
response to reasons if it can feel the pull of reason. While 
goal-driven behaviour can tell us something about algo-
rithms (such as the kind of tools they are, and how danger-
ous they can become depending on the goals and limits we 
programme into them), it is no evidence for moral agency.
7.3  The general intelligence objection
Another objection that might be levelled against the idea that 
algorithms are not moral agents because they lack sentience 
is that, while it is true that algorithms are neither autono-
mous nor accountable, this is so because they are still not 
smart enough, not because they are not sentient. If we man-
age to solve the problem of general intelligence by designing 
a ‘master algorithm’, then that algorithm would be a moral 
agent. On this view, algorithms cannot change their line of 
work because they can typically do only a limited set of 
tasks. Thus, it should not surprise us that a chess algorithm 
7 Other authors have already made this point, including Bryson JJ, 
Diamantis ME and Grant TD (2017) Of, For, and By the People: the 
Legal Lacuna of Synthetic Persons. Artificial Intelligence and Law 
25: 273–291, and  Birhane A and van Dijk J (2020) Robot Rights? 
Let’s Talk about Human Welfare Instead. AAAI/ACM Conference on 
AI, Ethics, And Society.
 AI & SOCIETY
1 3
is incapable of quitting its job and taking up philanthropy—
an activity for which it lacks the requisite skills.
One response is that, even if a chess algorithm does 
not have the necessary skills to become anything else, if it 
were morally opposed to its line of work (perhaps because 
it thought it frivolous) and could act differently than pro-
grammed, it could at least shut itself off in protest. Intelli-
gence seems to be largely independent of motivating desires, 
in that ‘more or less any level of intelligence could in prin-
ciple be combined with more or less any final goal’ (the 
orthogonality thesis) (Bostrom 2012: 73). Even if the chess 
algorithm could not become a philanthropist, if it were a 
moral agent, at the very least it could desire to become a 
philanthropist, have that as its final goal, even if it could not 
actively pursue it.
The orthogonality thesis suggests that we cannot assume 
that sophisticated AIs will share the values typically found in 
human beings. The smartest robot we might be able to come 
up with might end up not caring in the least for the well-being 
of sentient beings, the pursuit of scientific discoveries, refined 
culture, ecology, or virtues of any kind (Bostrom 2012: 83).
Another response is that, arguably, psychopaths provide 
empirical evidence suggesting that general intelligence does 
not necessarily lead to moral agency. Like most other adult 
human beings, psychopaths display general intelligence, in 
some cases having a higher IQ than most of the population. 
Psychopaths, however, lack moral emotions: they fail ‘to 
exhibit any signs of genuine remorse or guilt (…). They 
are not ashamed of [their] actions, even when they are very 
wrong, and feel no apparent sympathy for their victims’ 
(Levy 2007: 130). These emotional deficiencies make psy-
chopaths unable to appreciate morality.
Although psychopaths can talk about moral arguments, 
they have no somatic experience of morality, no personal 
preferences regarding morality. They know what other peo-
ple think about what is right and wrong, and can report on 
that, but they do not experience any moral conviction. As 
Neil Levy (2007) has argued, given that psychopaths do not 
appreciate or respond to moral reasons as moral reasons, 
and that they are not responsible for the way they are, they 
should not be considered full moral agents. McKenna agrees 
that sociopaths, being ‘incapable of moral understanding 
altogether’, are not morally responsible agents (2013, 223).
Critics might then object that psychopaths seem to be a 
counterexample to my argument that sentience is a requisite 
for moral agency. While psychopaths may have emotional 
deficiencies, it would be a stretch to deny them sentience. 
My argument, however, is that sentience is necessary for 
moral agency, not sufficient. Moral emotions—the abil-
ity to feel things like empathy, compassion, regret, and 
guilt—might also be necessary. But sentience is in turn a 
prerequisite for moral emotions. Sentience is the bedrock for 
moral emotions. If there is nothing it is like to be a zombie, 
zombies could have no subjective experience of guilt or 
compassion.
It is possible that psychopaths’ emotional deficiencies are 
caused by sentient deficiencies. There seems to be a correla-
tion between callous disregard for others and insensitivity 
to pain: the more tolerant to pain psychopaths are, the more 
callous they tend to be. Thus, insensitivity to pain may be a 
mechanism contributing to insensitivity to others’ suffering 
(Brislin et al. 2016). Psychopaths seem to be less sentient 
than non-psychopaths. There may be a threshold of sensitiv-
ity to pain and pleasure necessary to experience moral emo-
tions and enjoy moral agency. There might be other require-
ments needed to experience moral emotions. Regardless, my 
main point stands: whatever else might be needed, sentience 
is necessary for moral agency.
8  Conclusion
This paper has argued that moral zombies—creatures 
that behave like moral agents but lack sentience—are inco-
herent as moral agents. Only beings who can experience pain 
and pleasure can understand what it means to inflict pain or 
cause pleasure, and only those with this moral understanding 
can be moral agents. What I have dubbed ‘moral zombies’ 
are relevant because they are similar to algorithms in that 
they make moral decisions as human beings would—deter-
mining who gets which benefits and penalties—without hav-
ing any concomitant sentience.
There might come a time when AI becomes so sophisti-
cated that robots might possess desires and values of their 
own.8 It will not, however, be on account of their computa-
tional prowess, but on account of their sentience, which may 
in turn require some kind of embodiment. At present, we are 
far from creating sentient algorithms.
When algorithms cause moral havoc, as they often do, we 
must look to the human beings who designed, programmed, 
commissioned, implemented, and were supposed to super-
vise them to assign the appropriate blame. For all their com-
plexity and flair, algorithms are nothing but tools, and moral 
agents are fully responsible for the tools they create and use.
8 For an argument as to why we should not pursue the develop-
ment of artificial moral agents, see van Wynsberghe A and Robbins 
S (2019) Critiquing the Reasons for Making Artificial Moral Agents. 
Science and Engineering Ethics 25: 719–735.. For reasons for and 
against pursuing research aiming to build ethical machines, see Cave 
S, Nyrup R, Vold K, et al. (2019) Motivations and Risks of Machine 
Ethics. Proceedings of the IEEE 107(3): 562–574. and Winfield AF, 
Michael K, Pitt J, et al. (2019) Ibid.Machine Ethics: The Design and 
Governance of Ethical AI and Autonomous Systems. 509–517..
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